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In our work, we’ve argued that, contrary to the conventional 
creed, capitalists dislike recovery. Their main driving force, 
we’ve claimed, is not the absolute level of their income, but its 
distributive share, and this later emphasis has far-reaching impli-
cation. Whereas the absolute level of capitalist income corre-
lates with the absolute level of economic activity, the distribu-
tive share of that income depends on capitalist power. And in 
the United States – and this is the key point here – the power of 
capitalists relative to the underlying population depends cru-
cially on the sabotage inflicted by unemployment. Since unem-
ployment is inversely related to growth, it follows that capital-
ists cannot really afford recovery, particularly a prolonged one. 
This claim is illustrated by the first figure, taken from our 
paper ‘Can Capitalists Afford Recovery’ (Bichler and Nitzan 
2013; Nitzan and Bichler 2014a). The chart shows the overall 
share of capital in domestic income along with the rate of un-
employment. The top panel displays the levels of the two vari-
ables, both smoothed as 5-year moving averages. The solid line, 
plotted against the left log scale, shows pretax profit and net 
interest as a percent of domestic income. The dotted line, plot-
ted against the right log scale, shows the rate of unemployment 
three years earlier. The bottom panel shows the annual rates of 
change of the two top variables since 1940. 
  
A Leading Indicator 
  
The data show unemployment to be a highly reliable leading 
indicator for the capitalist share of domestic income, for both 
levels and rates of change. In general, the higher the level (or 
rate of change) of unemployment, the greater the share of capi-
tal in domestic income (or its rate of change), and vice versa.  
Based on this long-term relationship, we wrote in 2014 
that, ‘Looking forward, capitalists have reason to remain crisis-
happy: with the rate of unemployment again approaching post-
war highs, their income share has more room to rise in the years 




And that is indeed what happened. According 
to the second, the up-to-date figure, in 2013, the 
share of capital in domestic income started to rise 
(top panel) while its growth rate accelerated (bottom 
panel). But the ascent didn’t last long. Unemploy-
ment had peaked, and as it started its prolonged de-
cline, the capitalist income share as well as its rate of 
change headed south.  
 
The Coming CasP Crisis 
  
Looking forward, the prognosis for capitalists seems 
negative. Over the last few years, unemployment has 
fallen sharply, and if the predictive power of our 
chart remains intact, the capitalist income-share-
read-power is bound to contract further, raising the 
ante for a prolonged accumulation crisis. Eventu-
ally, though, capitalists are likely the resolve their 
CasP crisis, as they have done repeatedly for nearly 
a century, by offloading it onto the underlying pop-
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A Closer Look (a follow-up post, November 2, 2018) 
 
Our RWER blog post, ‘Can capitalists afford recovery: A 2018 update’, showed U.S. unemployment to be a highly 
reliable leading indicator for the capitalist share of domestic income three years later.  
An observant commentator, though, suggested otherwise (first comment by jayarava). Although true for much of 
the postwar period, this association no longer holds, s/he argued. ‘Something changed after the global financial crisis to 
decouple unemployment from income shares’, s/he posited, pointing to the ‘new power of globalized capital to force 
down wages even in times of [low] unemployment’ (or rather, that during an expansion, capitalists can raise prices faster 
than wages, thereby augmenting their income share, which is the conventional view; Profit from Crisis, 2014: 130). 
Plotted in 2018 
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This post assesses this claim more closely, by ex-
amining the correlation between (1) absolute levels of 
unemployment and the capitalist share of income, 




Figure A1 deals with absolute levels. The top panel 
shows pretax profit and net interest as a share of do-
mestic income on the left log scale and the rate of 
unemployment three years earlier on the right log 
scale (original series are smoothed as 5-year trailing 
averages). The bottom panel shows two measures of 
correlation between these two series. The first is a 
10-year trailing correlation, where each observation 
shows the Pearson correlation coefficient over the 
past ten years. The second is a 30-year trailing corre-
lation, with each observation denoting the correla-
tion over the past 30 years.  
Until the 1960s, both correlations were unstable 
and occasionally negative. Unemployment certainly 
sabotaged the underlying population, but its effect 
on the capitalist share of domestic income was 
hardly systematic and therefore unreliable as a redis-
tributional lever. From the 1960s onward, though, 
the relationship began to stabilize, and by the 1970s 
unemployment became an almost perfect predictor 
of the capitalist share of domestic income three years 
later. All in all, until the early 2010s, both the 10- 
and 30-year trailing correlations hovered around 0.9, 
with very minor deviations.  
But then, as the commentator correctly observed, in the early 2010s things seem to have changed, with both measures 
dropping and the 10-year correlation becoming negative in the second half of the decade.  
Whether this drop represents a meaningful ‘structural change’ remains to be seen (note that a similar drop in the corre-
lations during the early 1960s proved temporary). Moreover, absolute levels are just one aspect of the nexus between 
unemployment and the capitalist share of income. The other is rates of change, and here the pattern seems unchanged. 
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Rates of Change 
 
The top panel of Figure A2 plots the annual growth 
rates of unemployment and the capitalist share of 
income, while the bottom panel measures their 10-
year and 30-year trailing correlations. 
The overall temporal picture here is not very 
different from the one presented in Figure A1: the 
correlations between the rates of change were rela-
tively unstable and occasionally negative till the 
1960s and positive and relatively stable thereafter. 
The main difference concerns the decade of the 
2010s. Whereas in Figure A1, the 10-year absolute 
levels correlation drops to negative territory, in Fig-
ure A2 the rates of change correlations – at both at 
the 10- and 30-year range – remain positive. As of 
2017, the 30-year correlation was 0.6, while the 10-
year correlation was nearly 0.8.   
Judging by this figure, the efficacy of capitalist 
sabotage in the United States remains intact. Capi-
talists continue to use crisis and rising unemploy-
ment as a means of boosting their income-share-
read power. In this context, the post-2009 recovery 
and falling unemployment are now undermining 
their income share, and that is something they can 
hardly afford, certainly not indefinitely. From this 
viewpoint, the end of the current recovery is a cap-
ital-as-power certainty. 
 
